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Abstract 
This article provides a novel insight into how early-career socio-legal scholars in the UK may combine different 
theoretical tools in their research, and the implications that this may have for the socio-legal discipline more 
broadly. The article draws upon the author’s experience of combining theoretical tools from different schools of 
thought: feminist legal theory, a Bourdieusian theory of class, and Actor Network Theory, within the context of 
recent research which sought to understand experiences of people who are representing themselves in family 
court hearings in England and Wales. Given that this is the first time these theories have been drawn together, 
it explores the difficulties, tensions, and benefits of combining these tools within socio-legal research, and reflects 
upon the important ways in which this theoretical and methodological innovation was influenced by the 
pedagogical and institutional resources that characterise the socio-legal research environment in the UK. Using 
this theoretical framework as an example, the article argues that the task of combining different tools provides 
scholars with the opportunity to work politically, because the process of reconciling tensions between different 
approaches inevitably requires researchers to reflect upon the assumptions and worldviews that underpin each 
of their selected theories. In this sense, it argues that combining different theories within socio-legal research is 
a political activity, because researchers are required to decide which of these assumptions and worldviews to 
reiterate, and which they should resist, when they produce multifaceted theoretical frames. Working politically, 
therefore, means to reflect not only upon how theoretical choices affect one’s own research outcomes, but also 
upon how these choices may contest, expand or develop the dominant assumptions and worldviews that 
characterise socio-legal scholarly traditions. This degree of reflexivity is imperative among early career scholars 
who choose to combine multiple theories, because the work of these scholars will shape the future assumptions 




The discipline of ‘socio-legal’ encompasses a broad range of scholarship which distinguishes itself from doctrinal 
approaches to law. Notwithstanding this breadth, the discipline is far from fragmented in the UK. Rather, in 
addition to using analytical tools from a variety of other disciplines beyond law (and often beyond sociology), 
pioneering scholars have also invested decades into organising themselves under the banner of “socio-legal.”1 
Particularly within the UK, this innovation has resulted in a fertile research environment for early-career 
scholars, who frequently benefit from socio-legal pedagogical influences within their legal education, 
institutional support for socio-legal doctoral projects, as well as the systematic supervision and guidance of more 
senior scholars who continue to play an important role in consolidating and pushing the boundaries of the 
discipline. As a result, the emerging generation of socio-legal researchers in the UK are less likely to face barriers 
in establishing the value of using interdisciplinary approaches to study the complex and situated role of law 
within society. However, they are instead faced with a different challenge – important choices about how to use 
the tools and resources available to them from the different schools of thought which fall under this banner of 
socio-legal studies. These choices have important implications for which scholarly traditions are strengthened 
and reiterated, and how the discipline is to continue to develop.  
 
The purpose of this article is to provide an insight into how early-career socio-legal researchers may build upon 
the work of previous generations by combining multiple socio-legal tools from different schools of thought. It 
contributes a reflective account of how it was possible to draw together multiple socio-legal tools within my 
own recent research project undertaken in the UK. The aim of this research was to provide a deeper 
understanding of what it is like for people who are representing themselves as Litigants in Person in court in 
 
* Jess Mant is a Lecturer in Law at Cardiff University, UK. Email: MantJ@Cardiff.ac.uk. The author is grateful to Katie Richards, Steve Smith, 
Pauline Roberts, Rachel Cahill O’callaghan, and the editors of this special issue for their feedback on earlier drafts of this work. 
1 See generally: Sally Wheeler & Phil Thomas, Socio-Legal Studies, in LAW(S) FUTURES 267 (Hayton David ed. 2000). 
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England and Wales, following a major withdrawal of legal aid for private family law cases by the UK government.2 
As part of this project, I conducted interviews with Litigants in Person to find out about the difficulties they 
experienced following this reform.3 In doing so, I required conceptual resources that enabled me to do two 
things. Firstly, I needed to understand how structural inequalities in society may shape the experiences that 
people in England and Wales have of using law. Secondly, I needed to reflect on how the culture and procedure 
of the legal system in England and Wales may itself facilitate or exacerbate experiences of disadvantage. To 
these ends, I devised a unique theoretical framework by drawing together three different approaches, each 
originating from distinct schools of thought which have, to varying degrees, been used by scholars working 
within the socio-legal discipline in the UK, but have never before been drawn together: feminist legal theory, 
Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social class, and Actor-Network Theory (ANT). 
 
The article will begin by outlining the usefulness of these approaches for understanding experiences of inequality 
and disadvantage, and discussing the challenges inherent in the task of combining these approaches. Firstly, I 
explain that feminist legal theory is a useful resource for appreciating how law is often formulated in a way that 
is blind to marginalised experiences, and how multiple structures of inequality may overlap in order to produce 
unique and intersectional experiences of law. Specifically, it encourages researchers to ask the “woman 
question” – which means to ask questions aimed at exposing these hidden, diverse and intersectional 
perspectives of law. Secondly, I argue that this approach can be reinforced with Bourdieusian theory, which 
specifically addresses issues of class, systems and processes. This particular theory provides three key concepts 
– capital, field and habitus – which are useful for tracing those structural inequalities that feminist theory 
demonstrates are otherwise absent from law and policy. Combining these two theories enabled me to use 
Bourdieusian concepts in an intersectional way, which meant both extending the scope of my analysis to 
incorporate understandings of class, as well as tracing multiple and overlapping structural forms of inequality 
which intersect to produce unique experiences of disadvantage. 
 
Building upon these two combined approaches, I then discuss the value of drawing upon the third approach of 
ANT. While the first two approaches provide useful ways to think through the structural context of difference 
and inequality, it is useful to go further in order to understand how these inequalities may manifest as 
disadvantage within the specific context of the family court in England and Wales. ANT, therefore, provides a 
pragmatic tool for examining the material ways in which Litigants in Person may experience disadvantage within 
the legal system itself. This involves tracing the detail of the interactions that Litigants in Person have with other 
people, objects and environments in the legal system. As an approach, ANT has been criticised within socio-legal 
studies for being problematically anti-structural, but at the same time, it is nevertheless also distinctly anti-
doctrinal, because it requires researchers to view law as only one part of a complex network of actors, instead 
of endowing law with symbolic significance. I will argue that ANT can be used in a way that complements the 
structural tools drawn from the other two approaches, because it enabled me to also explore the specific and 
material practices through which inequalities and difference manifest in disadvantage within the legal system in 
England and Wales. 
 
The article will then discuss the tensions that underpinned the research process as a result of the decision to 
use these approaches together. Here, it will argue that the task of working through these tensions is a political 
activity which holds important consequences for the socio-legal discipline. Different theories – particularly those 
which emerge from different schools of thought – are underpinned by different ontological and epistemological 
assumptions. As such, it is generally accepted that a researcher’s choice of theory shapes their understanding 
of their research problem. However, when combining multiple theories, researchers are forced to consider the 
assumptions that underpin each of their selected theories, and how they contest each other. They must then 
decide which of these assumptions to prioritise and which to reject in order to reconcile their theories into a 
theoretical frame that can be used within their research. These decisions are political, because they involve 
choosing which theoretical assumptions and worldviews underpin their research. Importantly, these decisions 
may also be political because scholars may make these decisions in a way that actively resists dominant 
assumptions and worldviews. On the basis of this, the article will argue that the task of combining different 
theories involves an opportunity to work politically, which means to reflect not only upon how theoretical 
 
2 Under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, state-funded legal aid for advice and representation has been 
almost entirely removed from private family law cases in England and Wales. 
3 For more detail on this research project and issue within England and Wales more generally, see: Jess Mant, Litigants’ Experiences of the 
post-LASPO Family Court: Key Findings from Recent Research 3 FAMILY LAW JOURNAL 300 (2019). 
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choices affect one’s own research outcomes, but also upon how these choices may contest, expand or develop 
the dominant assumptions and worldviews that characterise socio-legal scholarly traditions. This degree of 
reflexivity is imperative among early career scholars who choose to combine multiple theories, because the 
work of these scholars will shape the future assumptions and worldviews that characterise the socio-legal 
discipline. 
 
B. Feminist Legal Theory 
 
As a dominant school of thought within socio-legal studies, feminist legal scholarship encompasses a broad and 
diverse literature which offers a range of insights into how law can operate to exclude and marginalise women, 
facilitate and contribute to their experiences of wider inequalities, and omit their subjectivities whilst presenting 
male subjectivities as objective, legitimate, or simply as common sense. A rich history of feminist perspectives 
has been useful for achieving a great deal in terms of substantive legal and political reform, as well as informing 
how scholars think about the basis upon which such claims should be formulated.4 Often conceptualised as 
“waves” of feminism, these have ranged from liberal claims for formal equality within law, radical calls for more 
focused attention on the relationship between sexual difference and oppression, to constructivist 
understandings of how men and women are constructed differently on the basis of their gender, and the specific 
ways in which law unevenly reinforces and reproduces these constructions.5 
 
In all forms, feminism seeks to reveal and develop an understanding of the conditions of women’s lives and 
suggest how these conditions may be improved – either by undertaking a broader critique of the structures that 
produce those conditions or advocating specific reforms within those structures.6 Importantly, both tasks 
involve telling stories that account for the diverse experiences of women – paying careful attention to different 
perspectives, definitions and meanings which have otherwise been omitted or silenced within law. By rendering 
the concerns of women both visible and valuable, feminist theory provides a resource for exposing how law is 
both actively and passively implicated in experiences of inequality and disadvantage. For example, early feminist 
legal scholarship has been key in campaigning for equality within law, and against the explicit and overt ways in 
which law may treat men and women differently. However, more recently, feminists have moved beyond calls 
for formal equality in order to expose the more subtle ways in which law omits the concerns and realities of 
women’s lives and is often complicit in conditions of inequality.7 
 
For instance, while statutory provision may now give equality between men and women in terms of legal 
entitlements, feminists have argued that law nevertheless frequently fails to acknowledge the important ways 
in which the conditions of their lives differ, or recognise that different treatment may sometimes be required in 
order to achieve substantive equality.8 Within the context of my research on Litigants in Person, for instance, it 
was possible to use a feminist lens to expose the distinctly gendered ways in which parents experienced the 
court process. Disproportionately, mothers had fewer economic resources with which to seek legal advice and 
representation in the absence of legal aid and are also overwhelmingly more likely to be contending with issues 
like domestic abuse within the court process. As such, my findings reiterated those of earlier projects in 
suggesting that the court process is not designed in a way that explicitly acknowledges the gendered reality of 
family disputes.9 
 
Across many jurisdictions, scholars, activists and lawyers have undertaken the task of rewriting judgments from 
a feminist perspective in order to show that even if law does not discriminate between men and women, its 
failure to incorporate the understandings, experiences and perceptions of women within its legal definitions and 
 
4 HILARIE BARNETT, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 8 (1998). 
5 Id. At 5-8. 
6 Jo Bridgeman & Daniel Monk, Introduction: Reflections on the Relationship Between Feminism and Child Law in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 
ON CHILD LAW 1 (BRIDGEMAN JO & MONK DANIEL eds. 2000) at 7. 
7 Alison Diduck & Katherine O’Donovan, Feminism and Families: Plus ca change? In FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY LAW 1 (DIDUCK 
ALISON & O’DONOVAN KATHERINE eds. 2006) at 2-5; JOANNE CONAGHAN, LAW AND GENDER 103 (2013). 
8 Diduck & O’Donovan, Id. at 9. 
9 Mant, supra n 3 and see also: Liz Trinder et al., Litigants in Person in Private Family Law Cases MINISTRY OF JUSTICE ANALYTICAL SERIES 
(2014). 
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rules is a cause of harm in and of itself.10 As these projects show, women experience inequality in multiple ways 
– both by way of gender-specific harms, and also by way of law’s failure to recognise and respond to them.11 As 
explored by Ulrike Schultz earlier in this special issue, law across jurisdictions tends to be designed around the 
idea of a “non-gendered, non-differentiated legal subject”, and this has important consequences for the role 
that law can play in ignoring, facilitating and reiterating the material inequalities that women experience within 
society.12 
 
As such, a feminist approach advocates expanding the lens of critique to include other structures and institutions 
which interact with law, such as the family, the labour market, or the tax and benefit system. Within different 
countries, cultures and political contexts, a feminist analysis will therefore inevitably vary, but a common goal is 
to study law as one of several forces that form the backdrop to a society that is structured in a way that omits 
the concerns and realities of women’s lives.13 Using feminism to expose these hidden perspectives involves 
asking what is often referred to as the “woman question”. In practice, this involves asking several different 
questions, such as: What kind of assumptions, descriptions or assertions underpin legal definitions and 
understandings? Further, how do these understandings compare to the lived realities and experiences of 
women? By asking these questions, it is possible to challenge the interests which are at the centre of law and 
demand justification for the inequalities and disadvantages that this disparity perpetuates.14  
 
Several feminist legal scholars have emphasised that this visibility is important for women, because it raises 
“collective consciousness” among women who recognise and relate to the experiences which are exposed 
through this activity.15 For example, there are some concerns which are common among women, such as the 
way in which structures like law operate to define the meaning of concepts like motherhood and mothering. 
Similarly, in their research into the legal aid system in Australia, Rosemary Hunter and Tracey De Simone found 
that although eligibility policy did not overtly distinguish between men and women, women were 
disproportionately disadvantaged by the fact that applications for family legal aid were afforded lower priority 
than those for legal aid in criminal matters, because the latter cases were presented as objectively more 
serious.16 Consciousness raising among women is therefore a means through which individual experiences of 
harm can be translated into collective experiences of oppression, which can in turn be used as an evidence base 
and an impetus to dismantle systems and structures which perpetuate inequality.17 However, while this has 
obvious value, feminist scholars have drawn attention to the important limitations of research that claims to 
expose the experiences and perspectives of women, without accommodating the diverse and intersectional 
ways in which different women experience law. 
 
Modern feminist scholarship, particularly that which is geared towards achieving legal and political reform, is 
intersectional. Intersectionality is a concept largely attributed to the ground-breaking work of Kimberlé 
Crenshaw.18 It is derived from arguments that mainstream feminist discourse was unable to account for the 
unique form of disadvantage which are experienced by women of colour, who exist at the intersection between 
racism and sexism. The idea that multiple forms of oppression or marginalisation can intersect and produce 
specific experiences of disadvantage has been taken up by feminists who seek to avoid producing research which 
 
10 Bridgeman & Monk, supra n 6, at 7; Feminist judgment projects have been undertaken in Australia, New Zealand, the United States as 
well as all UK jurisdictions. See: ROSEMARY HUNTER, CLARE MCGLYNN & ERICA RACKLEY, FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO 
PRACTICE (2010); HEATHER DOUGLAS, FRANCESCA BARTLETT, TRISH LUKER & ROSEMARY HUNTER, AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: 
RIGHTING AND REWRITING LAW (2014); KATHRYN STANCHI, LINDA BERGER & BRIDGET CRAWFORD, FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN 
OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2016); MÁIRÉAD ENRIGHT, JULIE MCCANDLESS & AOIFE O’DONOGHE, 
NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: JUDGES’ TROUBLES AND THE GENDERED POLITICS OF IDENTITY (2017); SHARON COWAN, CHLOË 
KENNEDY & VANESSA MUNRO, SCOTTISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: (RE)CREATING LAW FROM THE OUTSIDE IN (2019). 
11 Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 1 (1988). 
12 Rosemary Hunter, The Gendered ‘Socio’ of Socio-Legal Studies in EXPLORING THE ‘SOCIO’ OF SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES 205 (Feenan Dermott 
ed. 2013). 
13 Diduck and O’Donovan, supra n 7, at 5; Conaghan, supra n 7, at 103. 
14 Barnett, supra n 4, at 23. 
15 Katherine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 829 (1990) at 863-7. 
16 Rosemary Hunter & Tracey De Simone, Identifying Disadvantage: Beyond Intersectionality in INTERSECTIONALITY AND BEYOND: LAW, 
POWER AND THE POLITICS OF LOCATION 159 (Grabham Emily et al. eds. 2009) at 161-2. 
17 Bartlett, supra n 15, at 837. 
18 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics 1 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM 139 (1989); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color 43 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1241 (1991). 
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claims to speak for all women.19 In doing so, they recognise the value of raising collective consciousness, whilst 
also challenging the notion that women have a collective set of interests, characteristics, or needs.20 
 
In this sense, asking the “woman question” means asking questions that reach beyond issues of gender, and 
scrutinising how legal discourse also omits experiences of other inequalities.21 Further, rather than someone 
experiencing multiple forms of disadvantage at once, the metaphor of the intersection allows researchers to 
appreciate how people can be marginalised as a result of different kinds of disadvantage, which intersect in ways 
that are situated, particular, and which cannot be untangled from one another.22 A feminist approach which is 
intersectional seeks to expose the complexity of experiences that are omitted from law and legal practice, by 
telling stories that account for diverse experiences – including but not limited to gender – and resisting the 
temptation to explore just the aspects of people’s lives that the law determines to be relevant or important.23 
 
Asking the “woman question”, therefore, can broadly be understood as a commitment to constructing a 
narrative which is not built out of abstract principles but is instead built “from the ground up, out of concrete, 
specific practices”.24 However, in producing an account which can expose the complexity of experiences and 
perspectives, it is important not to lose sight of the structures that facilitate these experiences. A focus on 
intersectionality has, for some feminists, gone too far towards a “formulaic analysis” of individuals and their 
identity characteristics, and foregone the task of scrutinising and challenging structures, institutions and 
processes themselves.25 For example, understandings of social class are frequently absent from feminist 
intersectionality scholarship, because class does not function easily as an identity category; intersectional 
understandings of inequality are focused on how law responds to people’s experiences, while class analyses 
tend to focus on the structured processes by which those experiences are produced and mediated.26 A theory 
of class was, however, of imperative importance within my research, because the accessibility of legal advice 
and representation has historically been framed by socio-economic inequality, and the disparity between those 
who can access legal support is now even more stark in light of the removal of legal aid. Within this project, it 
was therefore useful to reinforce a feminist approach with a theory of social class, which is useful for tracing 
those structural inequalities that feminist theory demonstrates are otherwise absent from law and policy. 
 
C. Bourdieusian Theory 
 
Although Bourdieusian theory is not widely used within socio-legal studies in the UK, Pierre Bourdieu’s theory 
of class is particularly useful for studying experiences of law.27 This is because his theory provides three 
foundational concepts – capital, field and habitus – which can be used to understand how socio-economic 
inequality is reproduced through culture. This cultural focus permits an analysis which accounts for both the 
unequal distribution of resources, as well as the inequalities of recognition and value which characterise 
structures and institutions such as law. Further, these conceptual tools also enable researchers to explore how 
unequal arrangements are frequently reiterated through the interpretations of individuals themselves, as they 
subjectively assess and interpret their own position in relation to others within particular contexts like the legal 
system. As will be discussed shortly, this cultural dimension has enabled subsequent scholars to develop 
Bourdieu’s theory in order to understand the reproduction of other forms of difference beyond class, such as 
gender. In this section, I will outline these three concepts before discussing how these can be usefully combined 
with feminist legal theory in order to highlight how different inequalities may intersect with each other to 
produce complex experiences of disadvantage which are omitted within law. 
 
 
19 See, for example: Grabham et al., supra n 16. 
20 Joanne Conaghan, Intersectionality and UK Equality Initiatives 23 SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 317 (2007); Emily 
Grabham, Taxonomies of Inequality: Lawyers, Maps and the Challenge of Hybridity 15 SOCIAL AND LEGAL STUDIES 5 (2006); Barnett, supra 
n 4 at 7-8 and 19-21. 
21 Bartlett, supra n 15, at.837. 
22 Emily Grabham et al., Introduction in Grabham et al. eds., supra n 16 1 at 1. 
23 Conaghan, supra n 7, at 12-4. 
24 Adrienne Barnett Contact and Domestic Violence: The Ideological Divide in Bridgeman & Monk, supra n 6 129 at 133. 
25 Joanne Conaghan, Intersectionality and the Feminist Project in Grabham et al. eds., supra n 16 21. 
26 Id. at 30. 
27 A notable exception to this is the work of Hilary Sommerlad, who has productively drawn Bourdieusian theory into socio-legal research. 
See: Hilary Sommerlad, Socio-Legal Studies and the Cultural Practice of Lawyering in EXPLORING THE ‘SOCIO’ OF SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES 205 
(Feenan Dermott ed. 2013); Hilary Sommerlad, The “Social Magic” of Merit: Diversity, Equity and Inclusion in the English and Welsh Legal 
Profession, 83 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 2325 (2015).  
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I. Capital, Field and Habitus 
The first foundational Bourdieusian concept is capital. Economic capital is a resource that can be exchanged for 
benefits or used as a means of influence. However, for Bourdieu, capital also comes in three additional forms – 
cultural, social and symbolic. Cultural capital refers to the skills, knowledge and dispositions that people gain 
during their life, the form of which depends on the interactions and experiences they have within society.28 
Similarly, social capital refers to the social networks that people can draw upon for support during these 
interactions and experiences. Therefore, both forms of capital are accumulated through life experiences – they 
differ according to the people that an individual has met and formed connections with, as well as what they 
have learned, been exposed to, and taken interests in throughout their lives. In practice, both function as 
tangible resources which can be exchanged or used to gain advantages in different contexts. 
 
Symbolic capital, however, refers to things like authority, reputation and prestige, which can easily be used to 
accrue other forms of capital. Education is an important example of symbolic capital, because it is something 
that can be exchanged for other forms of valuable capital in a variety of different contexts.29 By distinguishing 
between these different kinds of resources, it is possible to understand how people from different social origins 
have different opportunities and possibilities available to them. However, rather than just signifying differences 
between people, the concept of capital can be used to expose the different value that is attributed to different 
kinds of capital within society. 
 
This leads to Bourdieu’s second concept – field. Bourdieu argued that society is made up of several overlapping 
fields which all have their own practices and hierarchies of value. If capitals are synonymous with wealth, then 
fields are the marketplaces in which those capitals are spent and exchanged. Within each field, therefore, 
capitals are assigned value which determines how they can be used and the extent to which people can succeed 
in each context. In this sense, fields are sites of competition in which people struggle against each other in order 
to establish their “cultural competence” within any given arena.30 In other words, the capitals that are useful 
within one field may be completely different from those that are valuable in another. However, there are some 
kinds of capital – such as the skills and confidence that may come from a University education – which are 
valuable across several fields, but the opportunities to accumulate this kind of symbolic privilege are by no 
means evenly distributed. In practice, Bourdieu argues, there are overlaps between fields relating to law, politics 
and economics, because the holders of symbolic capital across each of these fields have “kindred world views”.31 
In other words, those who hold power within society generally have a greater capacity to continually influence 
the shape and structure of official fields, and inevitably do so in their own interests. 
 
In relation to law, Bourdieu extensively discussed that one way of doing this is by privileging unique practices 
and hierarchies which characterise the “juridical field”.32 Here, he explains that law is a field with its own 
underpinning set of protocols and assumptions, as well as its own internal social, psychological and linguistic 
codes which all frame the way that law is practiced and negotiated but are never specifically recorded or 
acknowledged.33 For example, valued capitals in the juridical field include knowledge of and familiarity with legal 
rules, as well as specific ways of behaving and communicating which are perceived as authentic to law. These 
unique forms of cultural capital enable those who are initiated in law to “explore and exploit the range of 
possible rules and use them effectively as symbolic weapons to argue a case”.34 Similarly, within the juridical 
field, certain forms of speech and written text have greater meaning and value than they do outside of this 
context. For example, when giving legal judgments, the act of speaking has the specific power of making 
something true. Additionally, the written formalisation of text in a court document gives those words power in 
ways that would not be possible if they were simply said aloud.35 The value that is placed on juridical capital 
within the juridical field therefore has a distinctly exclusionary effect for those who have not been initiated 
through legal education and training. These exclusionary practices enable the juridical field to set its own cultural 
parameters of what is legally relevant and important, and to dismiss and devalue other skills and perspectives.36 
 
28 PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF THE ECONOMY – PIERRE BOURDIEU (2005) at 211. 
29 Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field 38 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 805 (1987) at 812. 
30 PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION (1984) at 86-7. 
31 Bourdieu, supra n 29, at 842. 
32 Id. 
33 Id., at 806. 
34 Id., at 827. 
35 Id., at 809-10. 
36 Id., at 828-9.   
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Bourdieu’s final concept is the habitus. The habitus is the internal mechanism through which people accumulate 
different kinds of capital, and develop their own sense for which capitals are useful when they engage with 
different fields. This concept requires researchers to consider how people perceive the context in which they 
find themselves, and how their responses can in turn further shape their experiences. As Mike Savage explains, 
“it is one thing to point to growing economic inequalities, but we need to see how people themselves see these 
divisions”.37 An important benefit of exploring experiences through the habitus, therefore, was to gain an insight 
into the subjective ways that Litigants in Person themselves perceived the processes of the family court in 
England and Wales. 
 
Taken together, these three concepts provide a means of tracing the ways that structural inequality and different 
perspectives may be discounted within the legal system, because the authority and legitimacy of law is instead 
derived from the supposed objectivity of legal rules and practices. However, through Bourdieusian theory, it is 
possible to expose that this is by no means objective – rather, the juridical field operates to selectively recognise 
certain capitals, and to discount capitals which do not fit neatly into the structure of this field. For example, 
within my research, Bourdieusian theory was useful for exploring how Litigants in Person frequently experienced 
cultural forms of exclusion from decision-making during court hearings, due to specialist language that was used 
by legal professionals, or because they were unable to comply with highly specialised procedure such as 
advocacy or cross-examination. In other words, they were often unable to participate in the manner expected 
by those working in the juridical field, and as such, perceived the court as an environment in which they were 
powerless to influence the outcome of hearings.38 Bourdieusian concepts can therefore be used to compliment 
and reinforce the feminist objectives of exposing the hidden narratives of law, as well as the implications of law’s 
blindness to inequality. 
 
II. An Intersectional Understanding of Inequality 
In relation to socio-economic inequality, these Bourdieusian concepts are extremely useful for understanding 
the important links between economic and cultural forms of subordination, and the implications of this for 
people who are attempting to participate in the juridical field. However, it is clear from feminist theory that 
economic inequality is not the only structural force that shapes experiences of law. Nancy Fraser argues, for 
instance, that although inherently linked with economic inequality, there are many other ways in which people 
can be oppressed or disadvantaged on the basis of who they are, and their status within other structures in 
society, like gender and race.39  
 
Although Bourdieu did not explicitly discuss this, his concepts are flexible enough to provide an understanding 
of these other structures of inequality, because they account for the historical reiteration of both unequal 
outcomes and the processes by which these outcomes are produced.40 For example, the task of extending these 
concepts to address other forms of disadvantage has already been taken forward by a new generation of 
Bourdieusian sociologists in the UK.41 Approaching these concepts from very different academic backgrounds to 
Bourdieu, these scholars have been able to develop concepts like “black cultural capital”, and drawn links 
between the habitus and the concept of “respectability” in order to address the ways in which structures of 
value are racialised and gendered as well as classed.42 
 
This means that it is possible to use these concepts in a way that is aligned with the feminist commitment to 
intersectionality. In relation to law, for instance, Hilary Sommerlad and Peter Sanderson use Bourdieusian theory 
 
37 MIKE SAVAGE, SOCIAL CLASS IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2015) at 1. 
38 Mant, supra n 3. 
39 Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a “Postsocial” Age in ADDING INSULT TO INJURY: NANCY FRASER 
DISCUSSES HER CRITICS (Olson Kevin eds. 9 2008) at 10-16; NANCY FRASER, FORTUNES OF FEMINISM: FROM STATE-MANAGED CAPITALISM 
TO NEOLIBERAL CRISIS (2013) at 193-4. 
40 HILARY SOMMERLAD & PETER SANDERSON, GENDER, CHOICE AND COMMITMENT: WOMEN SOLICITORS IN ENGLAND AND WALES AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL STATUS (1998) at 29 and 37. 
41 Ciaran Burke et al., Introduction: The Development of Bourdieu’s Intellectual Heritage in UK Sociology in BOURDIEU: THE NEXT 
GENERATION (Thatcher Jenny et al. eds. 1 2016). 
42 BEVERLEY SKEGGS. FORMATIONS OF CLASS AND GENDER: BECOMING RESPECTABLE (1997); Nicola Rollock, Legitimizing Black Academic 
Failure: Deconstructing Staff Discourses on Academic Success, Appearance and Behaviour 17 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN SOCIOLOGY OF 
EDUCATION 275 (2007); Derron Wallace, Re-Interpreting Bourdieu, Belonging and Black Identities: Exploring ‘Black’ Cultural Capital Among 
Black Caribbean Youth in London in Thatcher et al., supra n 41 37. 
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to argue that the juridical field facilitates a culture which is specifically exclusionary to women.43 In their work, 
Sommerlad and Sanderson use the concept of field to demonstrate how legal rules are gender blind, and 
therefore do not account for structural constraints like caring responsibilities or other social arrangements which 
disproportionately affect women. As such, the inequality that women experience across society is constructed 
as irrelevant within the juridical field.44 Additionally, through the concept of capital, they explore the ways in 
which women can be ascribed certain characteristics based on their sex or gender, which are then devalued 
within the juridical field. In their work, characteristics associated with femininity or motherhood were ascribed 
to women by others in the field, and these were then undermined, misrecognised and devalued in ways that 
those held by men were not.45 In this sense, Bourdieusian concepts can be used to understand how gender-
based inequality can produce disadvantage which is different to the disadvantages which stem from socio-
economic inequality, and that both of these structural inequalities can compound and intersect each other 
within the lived experiences of women. 
 
Bourdieusian concepts can therefore be used to think through not only how different structures of inequality 
operate, but also be applied in an intersectional way, so as to gain an understanding of how categories like class 
and gender work together to produce unique experiences of disadvantage. A major benefit of doing this is that 
it enables analysis to move beyond talking about categories like gender, race and class as if they are mutually 
exclusive. Instead, an intersectional application of Bourdieusian theory provides an imperative to “complicate 
our understanding of the social dynamics of inequality” by embracing the complex and overlapping ways in 
which these categories may operate.46 For example, within the context of this research, this meant I was able to 
recognise not only the cumulative ways in which Litigants in Person were affected by different structures of 
inequality, but also the unique and complicated ways in which they experienced disadvantage as a result of their 
different social positions.  
 
Taken together, Bourdieu’s concepts and feminist legal theory provide extremely useful and versatile tools 
which can be used to expose a rich understanding of how different structural inequalities may shape the 
experiences that people have of law, and how law operates to cut through these lived realities. However, they 
do not in themselves provide tools to understand how these inequalities may manifest as disadvantage within 
the legal system itself. Given that the purpose of this research was to understand the disadvantages that may 
be facilitated within this system, it was important to reinforce these structural tools with the third approach of 
ANT, which provides a materialist understanding of disadvantage within specific contexts. 
 
D. Actor-Network Theory 
 
Despite the word “theory” in its name, Actor-Network Theory is best understood as an analytical method that 
can be used to explore social arrangements, rather than a theory through which to understand or explain them. 
This approach was developed within the field of science and technology studies and is commonly attributed to 
the work of Bruno Latour.47 Taking inspiration from the scientific tradition, ANT advocates examining social 
arrangements on a micro scale, and encourages researchers to consider how material objects and locations play 
important roles within those arrangements.48 Although ANT is still used by only a few scholars within socio-legal 
studies49, it can be understood as part of a broader materialist turn within the discipline, which has emphasised 
the importance of recognising that law is, in fact, inseparable from its physical conditions.50 The material reality 
of law has sometimes been neglected within approaches which focus more heavily on the cultural 
 
43 Sommerlad & Sanderson, supra n 40, at 17. 
44 Id. at 2. 
45 Id. at 28-9 and 37-8. 
46 Grabham et al., supra n 22, at 13. 
47 BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NETWORK-THEORY (2005). 
48 JOHN LAW, AFTER METHOD: MESS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH (2004). 
49 ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2000); David Cowan and Helen Carr, Actor-Network Theory, Implementation, and the Private 
Landlord 35 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY 149 (2008); Alain Pottage, The Materiality of What? 39 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY 167 
(2012); EMILIE CLOATRE, PILLS FOR THE POOREST: AN EXPLORATION OF TRIPS AND ACCESS TO MEDICATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
(2013); EMILY GRABHAM, BREWING LEGAL TIMES: THINGS, FORM AND THE ENACTMENT OF LAW (2016); Caroline Hunter, Solar Panels, 
Homeowners and Leases: The Lease as a Socio-Legal Object in EXPLORING THE ‘LEGAL’ IN SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES (Cowan David & Wincott 
Daniel eds. 137 2016). 
50 MARIE-ANDREE JACOB, MATCHING ORGANS WITH DONORS: LEGALITY AND KINSHIP IN TRANSPLANTS (2012); ANDREAS PHILIPPOPOULOS-
MIHALOPOULOS, SPATIAL JUSTICE: BODY, LAWSCAPE, ATMOSPHERE (2014); Nicole Graham, Margaret Davies & Lee Godden, Broadening 
Law’s Context: Materiality in Socio-Legal Research 26 GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW 480 (2018). 
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manifestations of law and society.51 While feminist theory and Bourdieusian theory are useful for asking 
questions about the structural context in which Litigants in Person are navigating the legal system, Actor-
Network Theory is therefore useful for documenting the specific and material ways in which these experiences 
actually play out in the court process. However, because of its explicit focus on the micro-scale, there were also 
epistemological difficulties inherent in combining it with the other structural theories which comprised this 
framework. In this section, I will first outline the resources that this approach held for the research, before 
turning to reflect on how it was possible to reconcile this challenge and combine these three theories. 
 
I) The Actor-Network Theory Approach 
There are two central tenets of Actor-Network Theory. The first is that everyone and everything is both an actor 
within a network, and a network in itself. The second is that actors can be both human and non-human. The 
family court, for example, can be understood as one actor within the network of the legal system. However, if 
analytically useful, it can also be examined as a network which can be broken down into its own constituent 
actors; Litigants in Person, judges, lawyers, as well as courtrooms and paperwork. In turn, these actors can also 
be deconstructed and examined, and there is no limit to how far any object of analysis can be broken down into 
its constituent parts. This means is possible to explore in detail the relationships between its actors, and 
specifically trace how certain actors are able to influence others and shape the network. While some actors may 
be able to translate the objectives of others into those that mirror their own, others may have difficulty 
negotiating some of these relationships.52 Therefore, Actor-Network Theory is extremely useful for unpacking 
exactly how people may face specific problems at various stages of filling out paperwork, navigating court 
buildings, and constructing legal arguments, where their success depends on their relationships with other 
actors. Taking an Actor-Network Theory approach to this project involved carefully documenting the interactions 
that Litigants in Person had with different aspects of the legal system and paying specific attention to the 
material detail of those interactions. For example, this enabled me to appreciate the difficulties that Litigants in 
Person faced as a result of how physical court environments were designed, such as feeling intimidated by 
lawyers in court waiting areas and feeling disparaged by the formal layout of courtrooms.53 
 
In this sense, ANT is often described as “ethnographic”, because it requires researchers to describe the material 
manifestations of social arrangements, as well as the detailed process by which social arrangements come to 
be.54 This commitment of ANT has been particularly useful for socio-legal researchers who are interested in 
unravelling how law operates within society. As I have highlighted through Bourdieusian theory, the legal system 
is often artificially conceived as an arena with its own culture, assumptions, codes and practices. These all 
operate as internal sources of legitimacy for the juridical field but are never specifically recorded or 
acknowledged.55 Several scholars have already demonstrated the value of using ethnographic approaches in 
order to challenge these underpinning assumptions about how law is understood and experienced.56 However, 
it is this combination of an ethnographic commitment to detail with an particular attentiveness to materialism, 
which distinguishes ANT from just “good ethnography”, and made it a particularly useful tool for this project.57 
 
The materialist focus of ANT means that it asks questions about how non-human actors can play important roles 
and have significant effects for social arrangements. For example, Annelise Riles has used ANT to explore the 
role that documents play within the legal system.58 Legal documents, she argues, have the power to foreclose 
important and contentious debates. A document can be used as a means of rendering complex discussions as ‘a 
matter of settled history’, because the act of recording something in a document can never fully capture the 
oral discussions that took place to produce that document. In this sense, documents are artefacts of a prior 
struggle, which themselves provide sources of further authority which can be drawn upon at a later stage by 
 
51 MARGARET DAVIES, LAW UNLIMITED: MATERIALISM, PLURALISM AND LEGAL THEORY (2017) at 42. 
52 Helene Buzelin, Unexpected Allies: How Latour’s Network Theory Could Compliment Bourdieusian Analyses in Translation Studies 11 THE 
TRANSLATOR 193 (2005), at 196-7. 
53 Mant, supra n 3. 
54 Emilie Cloatre, Law and ANT (and its kin): Possibilities, Challenges and Ways Forward 45 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY 646 (2018); 
Gianpaolo Baiocchi et al., Actor-Network Theory and the Ethnographic Imagination: An Exercise in Translation 36 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY 
323 (2013) at 330. 
55 Bourdieu, supra n 28, at 806. 
56 An important example is legal consciousness scholarship, see: PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SIBLEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW (1998). 
57 Cloatre, supra n 52 at 659. 
58 ANNELISE RILES. DOCUMENTS: ARTIFACTS OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE (2006). 
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those who were able to influence the record in the first place.59 By tracing the specific role of the document 
within law, therefore, Riles is able to disrupt our thinking about how law is able to function and reinforce itself.60  
 
Focusing on the micro scale through ANT therefore also means having to re-engage with the very nature of law 
as a social category, discipline, institution, and label. Importantly, and in alignment with the criticisms of 
intersectionality, this ensures that the structures and processes of the legal system itself are subject to critical 
scrutiny. Rather than conceiving of law as something which is already made, ANT requires researchers to provide 
a detailed account of law in the making – how specific interactions and relationships work together to produce 
outcomes like disadvantage.61 
 
II. Combining Structural and Anti-Structural Approaches 
Taken together, the tenets of ANT require researchers to avoid taking social arrangements for granted, and 
instead to scrutinise the relationships that make those arrangements possible. In a way that clearly overlaps 
with feminist objectives, ANT is underpinned by a bottom-up approach to understanding the complexity of social 
arrangements. However, by advocating that social arrangements should be examined in a purely empirical way, 
ANT is epistemologically and ontologically distinct from the other theories in this framework. While feminist 
legal theory and Bourdieusian theory each provide different resources for understanding how disadvantage may 
relate to structural inequality and difference, ANT has traditionally been critical of these kinds of theoretical 
explanations. For Actor-Network theorists, using social theory to frame research findings is to take a shortcut – 
to treat inequality as an explanation for disadvantage, rather than to see disadvantage an effect of a social 
arrangement that needs to be explored.62 It was on this basis that Latour originally went so far as to argue that 
social theory such as Bourdieusian theory should be “jettisoned”.63  
 
Therefore, these were two contesting assumptions and worldviews that I needed to reconcile in order to draw 
these theories together into a theoretical framework that I could use within my research. On the one hand, ANT 
raises an important concern about the usefulness of social theory for understanding how people experience law. 
For instance, it would have been particularly detrimental to the aims of my project if I were to use theory in a 
way that simply reiterated theoretical presumptions and failed to extend current understandings or incorporate 
first-hand experiences of law. However, on the other hand, while this is an important criticism of how 
researchers may use theory, this also exposes a key weakness of the ANT approach. By advocating a flat ontology 
in which researchers may only explore what they find during their empirical investigations, ANT does not pay 
attention to the deeper and historically reiterated structures of inequality that provide the context within which 
these social practices unfold. In this sense, ANT may be interpreted as rejecting analyses which account for 
categories such as gender or class, or the historical dimensions of these structures. This scepticism of social 
theory has been heavily criticised. Feminist scholars in particular have argued that without a theoretical 
understanding of the ways in which macro structures and categories have historically reiterated arrangements 
of inequality, it is impossible to fully understand the relationships and interactions which take place on a micro 
scale.64  
 
By focusing only on the interactions that happen on the ground, ANT risks being “an apolitical strategy that 
effectively effaces the violent histories and embedded power imbalances that constitute social relations.”65 In 
other words, while ANT theorists may criticise structural approaches for explaining without describing, ANT is 
also at risk of describing without explaining.66 The task of drawing ANT into this theoretical framework was 
therefore a significant challenge, given that its underpinning assumptions and worldview risk reiterating a 
problematic blindness to structural arrangements of inequality. However, by working through this tension, I 
concluded that it is possible to use ANT in a way that is sensitive to this structural context for two reasons. 
 
59 Id. at 76-8 and 83. 
60 This is further reinforced by the work of other scholars who focus more generally on spatial and temporal dimensions of law. See: Marie-
Andree Jacob, The Strikethrough: An approach to Regulatory Writing and Professional Discipline 37 LEGAL STUDIES 137 (2017); LINDA 
MULCAHY, LEGAL ARCHITECTURE: JUSTICE, DUE PROCESS AND THE PLACE OF LAW (2010); Emily Grabham, Legal Form and Temporal 
Rationalities in UK Work-life Balance Law 29 AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST STUDIES 67 (2014). 
61 Cloatre, supra n 52 at 657-8; Ron Levi and Mariana Valverde, Studying Law by Association: Bruno Latour goes to the Conseil d’Etat 33 LAW 
AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 805 (2008) at 822. 
62 Baiocchi et al., supra n 51 at 336. 
63 Latour, supra n 46. 
64 Cloatre, supra n 52. 
65 Id. at 653. 
66 Levi & Valverde, supra n 59 at 822. 
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Firstly, it is possible to use Actor-Network Theory without adhering to anti-structuralism. Reconciling an anti-
structuralist approach with structural approaches is by no means simple, but it is still possible to use these 
approaches concurrently by following the example of other scholars who have explicitly rejected the anti-
structuralist ontology which underpins traditional ANT approaches. As ANT has been applied in multiple 
disciplines, researchers have confronted these important “blind spots”, and instead recommended using ANT 
Theory as a set of sensibilities which can be used more productively than traditional applications of Latourian 
ANT. For example, within law, Emilie Cloatre has most prominently mitigated these blind spots by taking the 
benefits of ANT’s micro approach, whilst rejecting ANT’s scepticism of structural theory. She argues that it is 
instead far more progressive to draw ANT together into theoretical frameworks with other theories that provide 
a proper account of how power and inequality operate on a structural scale.67 In doing so, Latour’s view of social 
theory has often been resigned to “classical” or “purist” forms of ANT, and is generally regarded as at best 
problematic, and at worst dangerous.68 
 
Secondly, rejecting anti-structuralism does not mean that ANT’s concerns about theory are discounted. Instead 
of “jettisoning” theory, researchers are encouraged instead to use ANT as a broad set of sensibilities which can 
be used as pragmatic guides through which to “orient” social theory.69 Cloatre has described this method of 
using ANT “as a matter of care”.70 As discussed so far in this section, these sensibilities include an attentiveness 
to the relational and material nature of social arrangements, as well as how particular social arrangements come 
to produce effects like disadvantage.71 By using ANT in this way, it is possible to move beyond using inequality 
or disadvantage as explanations for the social phenomena being studied, and instead commit to explaining how 
arrangements of disadvantage or inequality come to be, through a renewed attention to the micro-connections 
that form these arrangements.72 Although it is unlikely that he would have embraced ANT, Bourdieu himself 
actually advocated the idea that researchers should be open to different approaches. He recommends, for 
instance, that researchers should “mobilise all the techniques that are relevant and practically useable, given 
the definition of the object”.73 Similarly, as discussed earlier, the field of sociology within the UK includes an 
emerging generation of Bourdieusian scholars who are committed to developing and refining Bourdieu’s 
concepts beyond their original incarnation as a grand theory of society. Will Atkinson, for instance, explains that 
this task involves working with and against Bourdieu, and that researchers should not be afraid of deviating from 
him when the research demands it.74  
 
Instead of undermining the structural understandings gained from the other theories, it is therefore possible to 
use ANT as a resource for asking more questions about how disadvantage is experienced on the ground, rather 
than closing down questions about how that disadvantage is rooted in broader structures of inequality. In this 
sense, ANT – used as a sensibility – can be used in a way that actually elevates feminist concerns and objectives, 
because it indicates that researchers need to remain open to experiences which do not fit with pre-existing ideas 
that underpin structural theories. Even more importantly, ANT can be used in a way that holds researchers 
accountable to using theory in a way that helps to gain a deeper understanding of the experiences that people 
have of law.  
 
E. Working Politically: The Benefits of Tension 
 
These three approaches draw different conceptual resources from distinct schools of thought. Taken together, 
they provide the tools to understand how people are positioned differently within society, how this may shape 
specific forms of disadvantage, and how this plays out on a material level within the legal system in England and 
Wales. Combining these tools was by no means a simple task – there are several moving parts which work 
together and contradict each other in different ways. Most notably, there was an important conflict between 
the underpinning assumptions of ANT, and the other two approaches. While ANT suggests that knowledge 
 
67 Cloatre, supra n 52 at 660. 
68 Levi & Valverde, supra n 59 at 811; Cloatre, supra n 52 at 653 and 658. 
69 John Law and Vicky Singleton, ANT and Politics: Working In and On the World 36 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY 485 (2013) at 485-6. 
70 Cloatre, supra n 52 at 660-1. 
71 Baiocchi et al., supra n 52 at 335. 
72 Cloatre, supra n 52 at 653. 
73 PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOIC WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY (1992) at 227. 
74 Will Atkinson, From Sociological Fictions to Social Fictions: Some Bourdieusian Reflections on the Concepts of ‘Institutional Habitus’ and 
‘Family Habitus’ 32 BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION 331 (2011) at 344. 
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should be empirically driven and researchers should avoid using concepts like inequality as explanations for 
social phenomena, feminist theory and Bourdieusian theory suggest that empirical findings cannot be properly 
understood without a theoretical understanding of the structural context in which they occur. In order to draw 
these theories together within my research, therefore, I had to make a political decision to reject the anti-
structural premises of ANT, and instead conceptualise this approach simply as a sensibility. On the basis of this, 
I will now argue that the task of combining different theoretical approaches is frequently political, because 
researchers must consider how their theoretical choices affect not only their own research, but also how they 
may contest, expand or develop the dominant assumptions and worldviews that characterise socio-legal 
scholarly traditions. 
 
When combining approaches from different schools of thought, scholars are required to engage critically with 
each of their selected approaches, because they are forced to reflect on how these conceptual resources fit 
together and how they may contradict each other. Within the context of their own projects, this means that 
researchers have to distinguish between the contributions of different approaches and identify those that are 
valid within the context of the specific research questions at hand. However, when theories are underpinned by 
different epistemological or ontological assumptions, researchers will inevitably have to engage in what Davies 
calls a “politics of definition”. This occurs when two or more theoretical objects come into contact conceptually 
or physically, and cannot be reduced to a single form, thus leading to a clash of ideas and objectives. It is at this 
point that researchers must decide how to proceed, and are forced to apply a politics of definition, through 
which one set of assumptions is empowered or prioritised, and the others are marginalised.75  
 
Within the context of this project, for instance, the contradictions between the structural and anti-structural 
assumptions that underpinned these theories arose repeatedly, and as a result, the research process was 
characterised by a set of inherent and unrelenting tensions which frequently had to be confronted and 
reconciled at various key points of fieldwork and analysis. This task may be particularly difficult for researchers 
trained in certain scholarly traditions. For example, before undertaking this project, I had more experience 
working with traditional sociological approaches like Bourdieusian theory than with approaches like ANT. I was 
therefore conscious of the risk that I would favour Bourdieusian explanations of disadvantage in my analysis 
instead of taking the time to also explore these social arrangements through ANT. In order to contend with these 
clashes, I would continually revisit my own analysis and ensure that I was not using Bourdieusian concepts as 
explanatory tools, but rather employing them as tools with which to sensitise myself to wider structures, in light 
of the sensibilities I had drawn from ANT. The research process was by no means linear or comfortable but left 
me with a sense that I had been rigorous, careful and attentive. It is understandable and common for researchers 
to shy away from this kind of challenge. As Davies explains, within the discipline of law, there is a deep-running 
preference for an “aesthetic of coherence”.76 Arguments and findings are naturally more convincing if they 
present logical conclusions and do not draw attention to other elements that do not quite fit. But, she argues, 
there is “no logical reason for theory to insist upon purity and neatness, especially if it means excluding or 
foreclosing the intrinsic complexity of its objects…”.77  
 
Building upon this, I argue that engaging in this political task is particularly important for early career scholars, 
because these decisions about which assumptions and worldviews to reiterate or resist are not only political 
within the context of individual research projects, but also hold broader political consequences for the socio-
legal discipline. The research that is produced as a result of theoretical choices such as those outlined above, 
has the potential to contest, expand or develop existing narratives about what the world is like, how it should 
be studied, and whose voices and experiences should be relied upon when building an account of social 
phenomena. Legal theory in particular is historically rooted in works that reflect the perspectives of a narrow 
demographic, and it is therefore imperative for researchers to reflect upon how their theoretical choices may 
influence the kinds of narratives that govern socio-legal research.  
 
This sort of reflexivity aligns with a key objective of feminist research, which is to pay due care to the way that 
dominant narratives may easily be reiterated within research that appeals to existing structures of legitimacy, 
and to instead create the space for oppositional meanings to emerge.78 For example, Fraser has written 
 
75 Davies, supra n 50 at 10-11. 
76 Id. at 4. 
77 Id. at 5. 
78 Bartlett, supra n 15 at 857; Barnett, supra n 24 at 132. 
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extensively about the need for research to not only ask questions about inequalities of distribution or 
recognition within society, but also to pose important challenges to the ways in which particular voices are 
represented within the political process of determining the particular arrangements by which distribution or 
recognition occurs in the first place.79 Fundamentally, this involves acknowledging the constructed nature of 
knowledge, and recognising that forms of oppression can be rendered invisible not only by dominant structures 
of power, but also by the efforts of researchers who attempt to address these structures.80 When combining 
multiple theories, therefore, researchers should take this idea forward in order to work politically, by 
empowering or prioritising epistemological assumptions that expand the scope of dominant ideas and 
narratives, and marginalising those that close down opportunities for deeper and more meaningful 
understandings. At a fundamental level, this means that when scholars combine different theoretical tools, they 
can work politically by asking questions such as: What kind of knowledge are they likely to produce as a result 
of using certain social theories? How might this knowledge contribute, resist or reiterate existing power 
dynamics or structures of inequality? 
 
If done thoughtfully and with care, therefore, working politically to combine different approaches can open 
researchers up to broader analytical possibilities. For example, working through this tension enabled me to use 
very different theoretical tools simultaneously, in order to oscillate between macro and micro scales of analysis. 
In turn, this meant that it was possible for me to acknowledge both the broader historical significance of 
structural inequalities, whilst also remaining mindful as to the need to empirically explore how these inequalities 
actually manifest within material and everyday experiences. This sort of analytical flexibility can be extremely 
valuable in socio-legal projects. For example, in relation to her three conceptions of injustice, Fraser also 
distinguishes between different kinds of remedies that can be proposed within research. On the one hand, she 
argues, there are “affirmative” remedies, which attempt to redress inequality by improving current social 
arrangements – such as by redistributing resources or revaluing previously devalued identities within particular 
contexts. On the other hand, there are “transformative” remedies, which attempt to destabilise the assumed 
differentiations that exist between different social groups and transform the very basis upon which these 
resources are distributed or valued.81 It is tempting, especially within the UK where a greater amount of socio-
legal research is premised upon empirical work, to pay greater attention to affirmative remedies. This may often 
be a rational decision, as it is this work which is likely to have more immediate influence. For example, in this 
project it was possible to use ANT to reflect on how small changes to the court process – such as rearranging 
courtroom furniture or changing the order in which people spoke in the courtroom – could make a difference 
to many experiences of disadvantage that are currently unfolding in the legal system in England and Wales. 
However, by combining this with feminist theory and Bourdieusian theory, it was possible to produce research 
findings which also gave an insight into how arrangements within this legal system need to be transformed on 
a broader scale, in ways that account for the structural inequalities which characterise society as a whole and 
play an important role in these relationships. 
 
Inevitably, the ways in which scholars make theoretical choices are likely to be influenced by the context in 
which they are trained. In the introduction to this special issue, the authors discussed how the different scholarly 
traditions between Germany and the UK have emerged as a result of different patterns of scholarship, 
pedagogical practices and institutional structures. From the papers in this collection, it appears that these 
differences have played an important role in shaping how early-career scholars across these jurisdictions 
conceptualise the possibilities of socio-legal studies. In the UK, for example, a growing interest in socio-legal 
research also facilitated greater retrospection among socio-legal scholars about how this scholarship might be 
used to inform university legal education.82 As such, the pedagogical influences of socio-legal research can be 
seen even at the undergraduate level of legal study. This is reinforced by the existence of institutional and 
national research council funding opportunities for students to embark upon socio-legal doctoral projects, which 
are extremely competitive but often come with integrated training pathways for research methods. Socio-legal 
doctoral candidates also often have the benefit of both inter- and intra-institutional training and financial 
support. The Socio-Legal Studies Association, for instance, is a charitable organisation which plays an important 
role in facilitating a socio-legal community of scholars within the UK by holding annual conferences, funding 
 
79 Fraser 2013, supra n 39.   
80 Bartlett, supra n 15 at 848. 
81 Fraser 2008, supra n 39. 
82 Fiona Cownie & Anthony Bradney, An Examined Life: Research into University Legal Education in the United Kingdom and the Journal of 
Law and Society 44 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY 129 (2017) at 137-8. 
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competitions for research grants, and sponsoring events which contribute to their aim of advancing education, 
research, teaching and knowledge in socio-legal studies.83 As part of their work, this includes dedicated training 
opportunities, workshops and funding opportunities for postgraduate and early-career members. In recent 
years, the organisation has seen a significant increase in the proportion of doctoral candidates within their 
membership, which is indicative of the structural support that exists for socio-legal early-career researchers in 
the UK. 
 
As one of these early-career scholars, it is inevitable that my own attitude towards research has been 
significantly shaped by this fertile environment of training and supervision. The work of leading socio-legal 
scholars as well as the support of the UK socio-legal community significantly influenced my experience of legal 
education and doctoral study in England and Wales, and continues to inform the teaching and research that I do 
through my own academic position. Early-career scholars in the UK are therefore less likely than those in other 
countries to face barriers to establishing the value of taking an interdisciplinary approach to studying law. 
However, the choices that they make about how to build upon the work of more senior scholars have important 
implications for which scholarly traditions are strengthened and reiterated, and how the discipline is to continue 
to develop. In this article, I have argued that early-career scholars may choose to combine approaches from 
different schools of thought within socio-legal studies. This activity of merging theory can be inherently critical 
simply by reflecting on the implications of research that relies upon particular conceptions, such as the 
legitimacy it may lend to particular views of the world. In this sense, Davies advocates the metaphor of 
“pathfinding” as a means for researchers to begin navigating theory in a way that adds further dimensions to 
existing patterns of legal thought.84 By following existing paths, or forging new paths, we reinforce and ultimately 
reimagine different understandings of law and its place within society.85 By this, she means that theory is not 
only useful for understanding existing social arrangements, but also for producing alternative imaginings of what 
these arrangements should be like. The conceptual and analytical choices we make therefore have important 
consequences, because: “…Drawing out aspects of the present that appear to provide direction for the future, 
and intensifying them theoretically, prefigures a world that is commensurable with the present and past, but 
which perhaps adds additional emphasis to those elements of it worth promoting.”86 The task of combining 
theories can therefore in practice be an extremely productive exercise for the discipline, because socio-legal 
scholars may be empowered to find unanticipated potential within their research projects and enabled to 




At the beginning of this paper, I stated that early-career socio-legal scholars are now faced with important 
choices about which theoretical, conceptual, and methodological tools they wish to employ within their 
research, and how they should do so. Inevitably, these choices have important implications for how socio-legal 
scholarship continues to grow and develop. In this paper, I have provided a reflection on my own experience of 
combining different socio-legal tools, in order to demonstrate the important value of merging approaches in a 
way which is both critical and attentive to these political possibilities. In doing so, I have outlined the difficulties 
and tensions that characterised the combination of feminist legal theory, Bourdieusian theory and ANT, but 
there are likely to be a wide range of other complexities that come with combining other approaches. Further, 
it may not always be possible to reconcile underpinning contradictions between various approaches, especially 
those from very different traditions and disciplines. Nevertheless, this paper has demonstrated that there is 
value to be derived from attempting to work through these tensions. When undertaken with care and reflexivity, 
the task of combining socio-legal tools can be an opportunity for scholars to work politically by reflecting on how 
their theoretical choices affect not only their own understanding of social phenomena, but also make an 
important contribution to the task of contesting and expanding upon the dominant assumptions and worldviews 
that characterise scholarly traditions. This reflexivity is particularly imperative among early career scholars who 
choose to combine multiple theories, because the work of these scholars will shape the future assumptions and 
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